As noted, parent undertakings have certain responsibilities in respect of their subsidiaries under CS3D. The parent must apply its mandatory due diligence policy to its subsidiaries, and must include its subsidiaries’ operations in both the initial screening for adverse impacts, as well as the in-depth investigations where risks are likely to be elevated. The parent’s responsibility to take appropriate measures against actual or potential adverse impacts may (depending on the circumstances) be more limited where the impact only relates to the subsidiary and not also the parent. Nonetheless, for complex corporate groups, this extension of responsibility is challenging both practically and conceptually, given that it subverts traditional concepts of separate legal personality and liability.
For certain types of asset managers, these provisions on responsibility for subsidiaries may have unwelcome (and possibly unintended) consequences.
The definition of “subsidiary” in CS3D Art 3(1)(e) incorporates the definition of subsidiary from the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC). According to the Transparency Directive, a controlled undertaking is one in which the second company (the parent) has a majority of the voting rights, or is a member and also has either the right to appoint or remove the board or controls the voting rights pursuant to a shareholder or member agreement, or exercises dominant influence or control.
In most structures, the asset manager will not own the shares in an investee company. The shares will be owned by the fund under management and, as noted above, the fund is likely to be scoped out. However, it will be important to analyse, on a case-by-case basis, the relationship between the asset manager (and any companies in its group, such as the general partner of an investment fund) and the underlying investee company. This analysis should consider whether a parent/subsidiary relationship may exist between the regulated financial undertaking and the investee company according to this extended definition of “subsidiary”. Such a relationship may exist indirectly, if the asset manager or one of its group companies is the “parent” of the fund which, in turn, is the “parent” of the portfolio company, or directly if there is a relationship with the investee company which meets the requirements of the definition. This is a complex analysis which may also depend on the law of the member state concerned and could lead to different results in different cases.
Asset managers – especially private equity and venture capital investors – will argue that, as financial owners with limited liability and no legal responsibility for management of the underlying company, adding this additional level of responsibility is inconsistent with their investment approach. There is specific legislation for financial market participants – most notably the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation – and changing the legal rules applicable to them in CS3D will put at risk the fundamental principle of limited liability investing, and the segregation of portfolio companies, which isolates investors from cross-contamination.
As the Financial Markets Law Committee (FMLC) argued in a letter to the European Commission on 22 February 2023 (available at: https://fmlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/FMLC-Letter-to-the-EU-Commission-on-CS3D.pdf), an asset manager “is unlikely to have the requisite operational control and/or expertise to identify and mitigate sustainability risks and doing so may give rise to conflict with the duties of the portfolio company’s board”. Furthermore, the FMLC points out that legal responsibility for adverse environmental and social impacts currently rests – and should rest – with the board of directors of the portfolio company (and the board of directors of the parent company in that corporate group); it would have significant consequences to locate that responsibility with an investor. It would also be out of step with accounting rules, which do not allow financial consolidation in circumstances where shares are held for investment purposes, on the basis that it would be misleading.
Financial investors with diverse portfolios may not be equipped to understand pertinent risks across all sectors and in all geographies, inevitably leading to some of the compliance burden of CS3D falling onto the portfolio companies themselves, despite the intent of the legislation being to include only the very largest companies in scope.
It is important to note that this issue is only relevant to determining an asset manager’s obligations under CS3D if it is in scope in its own right, and not to whether or not it is in scope in the first place. A parent company’s financial thresholds will be assessed on the basis of its consolidated financial statements, and will not include the turnover or employees of its “subsidiaries” if they are included in its accounts at fair value rather than on a consolidated basis.